


Chen Po-ta

MAO TSE-TUNG
ON THE
CHINESE REVOLUTION



FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS
PEKING



H-75

1953

First Edition

Second Edition (Revised Translation) 1963

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

Mao Tse-tung on the Chinese Revolution was written by Chen Po-ta in 1951 to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the Communist Party of China. The present English translation has been made from the second edition of the Chinese text published in September 1953 by the People's Publishing House, Peking.

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS
Printed in the People's Republic of China

I. MAO TSE-TUNG IS THE MOST OUTSTANDING
EXPONENT OF MARXISM-LENINISM IN CHINA

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I. MAO TSE-TUNG IS THE MOST OUTSTANDING EXPONENT OF MARXISM-LENINISM IN CHINA

In his article *On the People's Democratic Dictatorship* Mao Tse-tung states:

The salvos of the October Revolution brought us Marxism-Leninism. The October Revolution helped progressives in China, as throughout the world, to adopt the proletarian world outlook as the instrument for studying a nation's destiny and considering anew their own problems. Follow the path of the Russians — that was their conclusion.¹

As is widely known, Mao Tse-tung is the most outstanding representative of such progressives in China.

His greatest contribution to the Chinese revolution is that he has integrated the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, and solved the numerous problems which arose during the revolution, in a correct and brilliant manner. He has developed the science of Marxism-Leninism further by applying it to conditions in China and in the East, thereby leading the Chinese people's revolution to victory.

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1961, Vol. IV, p. 413.

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Mao Tse-tung says, "The theory of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin is a universally applicable theory."¹ However, to apply this theory to China correctly and transform it into the invincible power of the masses, it is essential to constantly clear away ideological obstacles and wage ideological battles, and fierce ones at that. For thirty years Mao Tse-tung has waged uncompromising struggles against various reactionary ideological trends outside the Party and against different forms of opportunism within. These include the struggles against the *Etatistes*,² the Right wing and the compromisers within the Kuomintang, *Chen Tu-hsiu-ism*,³ Trotskyism, the various reformist illusions about the counter-revolutionary Kuomintang rule harboured by the Right wing of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, the "Left" adventurism which held sway in the Party on several occasions, and the repetition of the mistakes of *Chen Tu-hsiu-ism*.

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Eng. ed., Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1954, Vol. II, p. 259.

² A group of unscrupulous fascist-minded politicians who formed the Chinese *Etatiste* Youth League, later renamed the Chinese Youth Party. Subsidized by the imperialists and the reactionary cliques in power, these counter-revolutionaries made a career out of opposing the Communist Party and the Soviet Union.

³ In the last period of the First Revolutionary Civil War (1924-27), the Right deviation in the Chinese Communist Party, as represented by Chen Tu-hsiu, developed into a line of capitulation. In co-operating with the Kuomintang, the capitulators relinquished the Party's leadership among the peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the middle bourgeoisie and especially among the armed forces, thus causing the defeat of that revolution. At an emergency conference of the Party's Central Committee in August 1927 Chen Tu-hsiu was removed from the position of General Secretary of the Party. Later, because he took a counter-revolutionary stand and collaborated with the Trotskyites, he was expelled from the Party.

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In the course of this series of struggles, Mao Tse-tung proved himself a great master in propagating and applying the revolutionary theory of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. The struggles which he conducted strengthened and consolidated the Communist Party of China.

The unity of theory and practice is a special feature of Marxism-Leninism. In revolutionary China, following in the footsteps of the great masters Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, Mao Tse-tung pays the utmost attention to the great creative power of the revolutionary masses. He has never separated his theoretical study of Marxism-Leninism from the revolutionary movement of the masses. Under all circumstances and at all times, he links Marxist-Leninist theory with the practice of the Chinese revolution and "uses the basic Marxist viewpoint — the method of class analysis", as Mao Tse-tung often speaks of it himself, to study, absorb and synthesize the experiences of the Chinese revolution. By so doing he has further proved the correctness of Marxism-Leninism and demonstrated its boundless, dynamic, revolutionary power.

It was precisely by basing himself on the creative power of the revolutionary masses in China and on the many-sided, complex experiences of the Chinese revolution that Mao Tse-tung developed Marxism-Leninism and exposed before the masses every kind of distortion aimed at vitiating or perverting Marxism-Leninism.

In his famous article *On the Significance of Militant Materialism* published in 1922, Lenin said:

... the dialectics which Marx . . . applied so successfully that now every day of the awakening to life and struggle of new classes in the East (Japan, India and China) — *i.e.*, the hundreds of millions of human

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beings who form the greater part of the population of the world and whose historical passivity and historical torpor have hitherto been conditions responsible for stagnation and decay in many advanced European countries — every day of the awakening to life of new peoples and new classes serves as a fresh confirmation of Marxism.¹

Without doubt, the awakening to life and struggle of the Chinese people under the leadership of the working class and the great victory they have recently won is a fresh confirmation of the large-scale, outstanding victory of Marxism-Leninism in the East. It is a confirmation of the fact that the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin are an all-powerful science applicable everywhere, and a confirmation that Mao Tse-tung, the leader of the Communist Party of China, has applied this science to the particular conditions of China and developed it with brilliant success.

II. MODERN CHINA WAS THE FOCAL POINT OF THE NUMEROUS CONTRADICTIONS IN THE EAST

For a hundred years, and especially after the end of the 19th century, China was the focal point of the numerous contradictions in the East.

In the first place, China was a semi-colony of the imperialist powers of the world, all of which fell upon

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Marx, Engels, Marxism*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1951, pp. 559-60.

China, regarding it as the biggest and meatiest bone of contention between them.

In 1916 in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* Lenin pointed out:

It is natural that the struggle for these semi-dependent countries should have become particularly bitter during the period of finance capital, when the rest of the world had already been divided up¹. . . .

The partition of China is only beginning, and the struggle between Japan, U.S.A., etc., in connection therewith is continually gaining in intensity.²

Stalin pointed out in 1927:

China is a nationally compact country with a population of several hundred million, and constitutes one of the most important markets and fields for capital export in the world. . . . imperialism has to strike at the living body of national China, cutting it to pieces and severing whole provinces from it, in order to preserve its old positions, or at least to retain some of them.³

Because the imperialist powers regarded China as their field of exploitation, on many occasions they formed a united front to oppose the Chinese revolution. For example, in 1900 the allied forces of eight imperialist powers invaded Peking and massacred the patriotic masses, the Yi Ho Tuan. In 1927 the imperialist coun-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Eng. ed., International Publishers, New York, 1942, Vol. XIX, p. 153.

² *Ibid.*, p. 167.

³ J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, Vol. IX, p. 262.

tries jointly opposed China's Great Revolution.¹ At other times, they worked in collusion to partition China. However, the ambition of these imperialist powers to seize a lion's share, or gain exclusive control of China, led to profound contradictions among them. It resulted, as Mao Tse-tung has stated, in "conflicts between the imperialists in China".

This meant that, as a result of the contradictions between the imperialist countries in their desire to partition China, their forces in the country were often divided rather than united.

Secondly, the contradictions and struggles between the imperialist countries had the effect of aggravating and sharpening the contradictions and struggles within the old ruling classes of China — the feudal landlords and compradors — leading to endless wars among the warlords.

Mao Tse-tung said in 1928:

A characteristic of semi-colonial China is that, since the first year of the Republic (1912 — *Translator.*), the various cliques of old and new warlords, supported by imperialism from abroad and by the comprador class and the landed gentry at home, have waged incessant wars against one another. . . .

Two things account for its occurrence, namely, localised agricultural economy (instead of unified capitalist economy) and the imperialist policy of division and exploitation by marking off spheres of influence.²

That is to say, because the Chinese feudal and comprador classes served different imperialist powers and

¹ 1924-27. See footnote on p. 19.

² Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, London, Vol. I, p. 65.

represented the interests of different local feudal forces, the ranks of this ruling camp were also divided rather than united.

Thirdly, joint oppression by imperialism and feudalism caused the Chinese people severe suffering. Ever since the Opium War of 1840, however, they have waged repeated and uncompromising struggles against imperialism and feudalism. If there were any pauses in these struggles they were of short duration. Moreover, inasmuch as China is a big country with a huge population, the number of people mobilized in each of these struggles was colossal.

The Chinese people fought against each and every one of the imperialist powers that invaded China and refused to submit to any of the counter-revolutionary regimes. China has been engaged in a long drawn-out revolution.

That is to say, the contradictions between the Chinese people on the one hand and imperialism and feudalism on the other were irreconcilable. In the course of their struggle against imperialism and feudalism, the Chinese people gradually became an extremely powerful, united force.

From what has been stated above, it can be seen that when we say modern China was the focal point of the contradictions in the East, we mean briefly that China was, first of all, the centre of the fierce struggle between the imperialist countries, and secondly, the centre of the fierce struggle between revolution and counter-revolution.

Obviously, only the victory of the Chinese people's revolution could resolve these contradictions and, beginning with China, break the chains of imperialism in the

East. The Chinese people had the strength to do this. However, it was only under the leadership of the proletariat that they could be organized into a force strong enough to achieve victory.

The remarkable militancy displayed by the Chinese working class was due chiefly to three reasons. First, the Chinese working class was subjected to the three ruthless forces of oppression, those of foreign imperialism, domestic feudalism and capitalism. Secondly, it was highly concentrated. Although Chinese industries were under-developed, they were concentrated, a large portion of industrial workers being engaged in modern enterprises each employing more than five hundred workers. Thirdly, although the industrial workers were in a minority in relation to the total population, the number of proletarians and semi-proletarians of various kinds was colossal. If the semi-proletarians in the countryside — the poor peasants — were included, the proletarians and semi-proletarians together constituted far more than half the total population. The oppression to which they were subjected was extremely cruel. For these reasons, the working class in revolutionary China developed into a powerful fighting force, formed its own strong, political party, the Communist Party, and became the leader of all the revolutionary classes in the country.

China, a large country engaged in protracted revolution, had a resolute, powerful, revolutionary working class which succeeded in becoming the leader of the vast mass of extremely militant peasants, indeed of all revolutionary forces. Also, because internationally it was the epoch of proletarian revolution, the epoch when socialism first triumphed in Russia, the Chinese revolution received excellent international help. These things ex-

plain why the victory of the Chinese people's revolution, the defeat of imperialism and its lackeys, the feudal and comprador classes, was inevitable.

Stalin pointed out in 1927:

... in China the struggle against imperialism is bound to assume a profoundly popular and distinctly national character and is bound to deepen step by step, developing into desperate clashes with imperialism and shaking the very foundations of imperialism throughout the world.¹

That is the course events have taken.

Naturally it should not be supposed that the victory of the revolution could have been won easily in such a vast country, which was the bone of contention between the various imperialist countries and where feudalism had been in existence for centuries. No, there was no easy way forward. In an article written in August 1949, Mao Tse-tung described the process of winning this victory as follows:

They fought, failed, fought again, failed again and fought again and accumulated 109 years of experience, accumulated the experience of hundreds of struggles, great and small, military and political, economic and cultural, with bloodshed and without bloodshed — and only then won today's basic victory.²

The process of the Chinese revolution has been an extremely ruthless, intricate and circuitous one. Yet it was this that enabled the Chinese working class and the peo-

¹ J. V. Stalin, *op. cit.*, pp. 262-63.

² Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Peking, Vol. IV, p. 426.

ple to become thoroughly steeled, and also enabled the party of the Chinese working class — the Communist Party of China — to become thoroughly steeled. Moreover, the rich experiences of the revolution have become the treasure of the Chinese working class and the Chinese people, and have inevitably enriched Marxist-Leninist theory.

China's rich revolutionary experiences are crystallized in the thinking and works of Mao Tse-tung.

In November 1919, Lenin pointed out to the Communists in the East:

Here you are confronted with a task which until now did not confront the Communists anywhere in the world: relying upon the general theory and practice of communism, you must adapt yourselves to peculiar conditions which do not exist in the European countries and be able to apply that theory and practice to conditions in which the bulk of the population are peasants, and in which the task is the waging of a struggle not against capitalism, but against medieval survivals.¹

And again:

You must find specific forms for this alliance of the foremost proletarians of the world with the toiling and exploited masses of the East whose conditions are in many cases medieval.²

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Address to the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, p. 24.

² *Ibid.*, p. 25.

Lenin also pointed out:

The task is to arouse the toiling masses to revolutionary activity, to independent action and organization, regardless of the level on which they may happen to be; to translate the true communist doctrine, which was intended for the Communists of the more advanced countries, into the language of every people; to carry out those practical tasks which must be carried out immediately, and to merge with the proletarians of other countries in a common struggle.

That is a problem the solution of which you will not find in any communist book, but which you will find in the common struggle that Russia has begun. You will have to tackle that problem and solve it by your own independent experience.¹

As is widely known, by their writings, Lenin and Stalin had solved the basic principles of the above-mentioned problem posed by Lenin. Stalin also made outstanding theoretical contributions on the Chinese question.

The task of Mao Tse-tung, leader of the Communist Party of China, has been to continue the work of Lenin and Stalin, to study Chinese experience unceasingly, to integrate the general theory and practice of communism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. He has translated the true communist doctrine, which was intended for the Communists of the more advanced countries, into the language of the Chinese people, supplemented that doctrine in the light of conditions in China, and transformed it into the theory and practice of the Chinese revolution. By so doing, he inspired hun-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

dreds of millions of people to join the world-wide struggle against imperialism, to ally themselves with the U.S.S.R., with the working class and progressive people in other countries, and with the oppressed nations throughout the world. With the fulfilment of this task, the rule of imperialism and its lackeys in the great land of China was overthrown.

III. THE CHINESE REVOLUTION IS PART OF THE WORLD REVOLUTION

Lenin and Stalin regarded the liberation movements of the oppressed nations as part of the world proletarian-socialist revolution.

Adhering to this theory of Lenin and Stalin, Mao Tse-tung never regarded the Chinese revolution as an isolated problem, but viewed it in the light of the world proletarian revolution and of the struggle against imperialism as a whole.

This is because we are living in the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution, the epoch when socialism has triumphed first in the Soviet Union, a new epoch of Marxism, or the epoch of Leninism. This is because the Chinese revolution is, above all, a revolution against imperialism.

In denouncing the *Tai Chi-tao-ism* of the Kuomintang in March 1926, in an article entitled *Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society*, Mao Tse-tung analysed the situation arising from the division of the world into two big camps:

. . . the present world situation is one in which the two major forces, revolution and counter-revolution, are locked in final struggle. Each has hoisted a huge banner: one is the red banner of revolution held aloft by the Third International as the rallying point for all the oppressed classes of the world, the other is the white banner of counter-revolution held aloft by the League of Nations as the rallying point for all the counter-revolutionaries of the world. The intermediate classes are bound to disintegrate quickly, some sections turning left to join the revolution, others turning right to join the counter-revolution; there is no room for them to remain "independent."¹

Mao Tse-tung's meaning is quite clear. Since the October Socialist Revolution, the world has been divided into two opposing camps, namely, the anti-imperialist camp led by the general world proletarian-socialist revolutionary movement, and the imperialist camp to which all counter-revolutionary forces rally. The Tai Chi-tao clique of the Kuomintang, representing the Right wing of the bourgeoisie at that time, actually served as Chiang Kai-shek's mouthpiece, preparing the way for his betrayal of the revolution. This clique opposed the theory of class struggle, disapproved of the Kuomintang allying itself with Russia and the Communist Party, and vainly hoped that they would remain "independent" of both the two big camps and establish a state under the exclusive rule of the bourgeoisie. Mao Tse-tung pointed out that their attempts were doomed to total failure because the intermediate classes were bound to disintegrate. The

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1962, pp. 2-3.

national bourgeoisie had either to turn left and ally itself with Russia and the Communist Party, accept the leadership of the proletariat and join hands with the worldwide general struggle against imperialism; or it had to turn right to oppose Russia and the Communist Party, oppose the proletarian revolutions in other countries and become a lackey of imperialism. The national bourgeoisie had a choice of either of these two alternatives, but no chance of "independence". In practice, the Right wing of the national bourgeoisie soon followed Chiang Kai-shek in his betrayal of the revolution and went over to the side of imperialism.

During the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-45), on the initiative of our Party, a broad national united front was re-established. The Kuomintang die-hards, however, returned once again to their shop-worn theme of a bourgeois dictatorship, which aimed actually at camouflaging and preserving the dictatorship of the big landlords and bureaucrat-capitalists represented by Chiang Kai-shek, the "one-party dictatorship" of the Kuomintang, or, as described by Mao Tse-tung, the semi-colonial and semi-feudal dictatorship. At the same time, inside our Party, once again a form of Right opportunism appeared, which attempted to turn the proletariat into an appendage of the big bourgeoisie. In order to lay bare the fallacious views of the Kuomintang die-hards, smash Right opportunism in the Party, and thus ensure that the Chinese proletariat, the broad masses of the Chinese people and our Party did not lose their bearings in the complex situation of the new national united front, Mao Tse-tung wrote an important work, *On New Democracy*.

In this militant work, Mao Tse-tung developed, more concretely and most profoundly, the above-mentioned

theory of Lenin and Stalin concerning revolution in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. He quoted from the writings of Stalin and, on the basis of the long experiences accumulated in the Chinese revolution, once again raised and dealt in detail with the question of the basic direction, or the basic line, of the Chinese revolution.

He explained:

... the first victorious socialist revolution, the October Revolution, have changed the historical direction of the whole world and marked a new historical era of the whole world.¹

He continued:

In an era when the world capitalist front has collapsed in one corner of the globe (a corner which forms one-sixth of the world), while in other parts it has fully revealed its decadence; when the remaining parts of capitalism cannot survive without relying more than ever on the colonies and semi-colonies; when a socialist state has been established and has declared that it is willing to fight in support of the liberation movement of all colonies and semi-colonies; when the proletariat of the capitalist countries is freeing itself day by day from the social-imperialist influence of the Social-Democratic Parties, and has also declared itself in support of the liberation movement of the colonies and semi-colonies — in such an era, any revolution that takes place in a colony or semi-colony against imperialism, *i.e.*, against the international bourgeoisie and international capitalism, belongs no longer to the old

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, London, Vol. III, p. 111.

category of bourgeois-democratic world revolution, but to a new category, and is no longer part of the old bourgeois or capitalist world revolution, but part of the new world revolution, the proletarian-socialist world revolution.¹

This is a basic Marxist-Leninist appraisal and analysis of revolution in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. From this analysis, a clear-cut conclusion concerning the basic direction of the Chinese revolution can naturally be drawn. The conclusion is: The Chinese revolution is part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution. Proceeding from this conclusion the following points become clear:

First: "Such a revolution deals unrelenting blows to imperialism, and hence is disapproved and opposed by imperialism. But it meets the approval of socialism and is supported by the socialist state and the socialist international proletariat."² "All the imperialist powers in the world are hostile to us; if China wants independence she can never attain it without the aid of the socialist state and the international proletariat. That is to say, she cannot attain it without the assistance of the Soviet Union, and the assistance given through anti-capitalist struggles waged by the proletariat in Japan, Britain, the United States, France, Germany and Italy."³

Secondly: ". . . the 'heroes' in the colonies and semi-colonies must either stand on the side of the imperialist front and become part of the force of world counter-revolution or stand on the side of the anti-imperialist

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 112.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

front and become part of the force of world revolution. They must stand either on this side or the other, for there is no third choice.”¹ “As the conflict between the socialist Soviet Union and the imperialist powers becomes further intensified, it is inevitable that China must stand either on one side or on the other. Is it possible to incline to neither side? No, this is an illusion.”²

Thirdly: “The world today is in a new era of revolutions and wars, a new era when capitalism is definitely dying and socialism is definitely flourishing. Under such conditions, is it not utterly fantastic to desire the establishment in China of a capitalist society under bourgeois dictatorship after her victory in fighting imperialism and feudalism?”³ “It is certain, definite and true that unless the die-hards among the Chinese bourgeoisie wake up, things will not go smoothly with them and their prospect will be one of self-sought ruin.”⁴

Fourthly: “. . . the Communist ideological system and social system are sweeping the world with the momentum of a land-slide and the power of a thunderbolt, and enjoy perpetual youth. Since the introduction of scientific communism into China, people’s vistas have been opened up, and the Chinese revolution has changed its physiognomy. Without the guidance of communism, the democratic revolution in China cannot succeed, let alone the later stage of the revolution. . . . The whole world today depends on communism for its salvation, and

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

² *Ibid.*, p. 135.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

China is no exception.”¹ “. . . whoever wants to oppose communism must prepare to be smashed to pieces.”²

All these propositions were raised by Mao Tse-tung ten years ago in his *On New Democracy*. Since then, he has continued to elucidate them in his many writings. Events in the world and in China during the past ten years have testified to their truth.

Naturally the elucidation of these propositions has crushed the narrow, reactionary nationalism of the bourgeoisie. It also liquidated the national prejudices of the petty bourgeoisie which was content with its own small, backward and isolated world.

To use the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, especially the teachings of Lenin and Stalin, to study and analyse the Chinese revolution from the basic viewpoint that the present epoch is one of imperialism and proletarian revolution, and thereby to develop this basic viewpoint and lead the Chinese revolution forward in the correct direction — this is the way in which Mao Tse-tung’s thinking triumphed.

IV. THE REVOLUTION OF THE BROAD MASSES OF THE PEOPLE UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

Basing himself on the fundamental changes in world history brought about by the October Socialist Revolution, and on the fundamental changes in Chinese history

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

² *Ibid.*, p. 137.

brought about by the appearance of the modern Chinese proletariat in the political arena, Mao Tse-tung pointed out that before the changes took place, the Chinese revolution was the old type of democratic revolution, *i.e.*, one led by the bourgeoisie, and that after the changes occurred the Chinese revolution became a new-democratic revolution, *i.e.*, one led by the proletariat.

Ever since his opposition to Chen Tu-hsiu's Right opportunism in the first revolutionary period¹ following the founding of the Party, Mao Tse-tung has, under all circumstances, consistently adhered to the theory of Lenin and Stalin concerning the leadership of the proletariat and has concretely developed it in accordance with conditions in China. During the first stage of the

¹The anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolutionary struggle waged by the Chinese people under the leadership of the Communist Party of China after it was founded in 1921 may be divided mainly into the following four periods: (1) The First Revolutionary Civil War period (1924-27), which is commonly called the period of the Great Revolution or the period of the Northern Expeditionary War. During this period, the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang worked in co-operation and waged an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolutionary struggle which mainly took the form of the Northern Expeditionary War against the Northern Warlords. Later the Kuomintang reactionary clique headed by Chiang Kai-shek, which represented the interests of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, betrayed the revolution. (2) The Second Revolutionary Civil War period (1927-37), which is commonly called the period of the Ten-Year Civil War, or the period of the Agrarian Revolution. The main struggles during this period were to establish and expand red political power, carry out the agrarian revolution and give armed resistance to the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang. (3) The period of the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-45). (4) The Third Revolutionary Civil War period (from the end of the War of Resistance in 1945 to the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949), which is also called the Chinese People's War of Liberation.

War of Resistance Against Japan, he conducted an irreconcilable struggle against the Right opportunism which had just emerged, and constantly emphasized the need to remember the lessons learned through the defeat of the revolution in 1927 — the criminal consequences of Chen Tu-hsiu's opportunism in abandoning the leadership of the proletariat. He constantly advises the members of the Chinese Communist Party to read carefully Lenin's great ideological work, *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*, because he regards this work as a powerful weapon to be used in opposing Right opportunism.

The problem of proletarian leadership in the Chinese revolution was connected with the weakness of the Chinese national bourgeoisie. In 1926, when dealing with the weakness of the national big bourgeoisie in China, Stalin wrote in his article *The Prospects of the Revolution in China*:

... it follows from this that the role of initiator and guide of the Chinese revolution, the role of leader of the Chinese peasantry, must inevitably fall to the Chinese proletariat and its party.¹

Mao Tse-tung said:

It is quite evident that whoever in China can lead the people to overthrow imperialism and the feudal forces will win the people's confidence, because the mortal enemies of the people are imperialism and the feudal forces, especially imperialism. . . . History has proved that the Chinese bourgeoisie is unable to fulfil

¹ J. V. Stalin, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 375.

this responsibility, which consequently cannot but fall on the shoulders of the proletariat.¹

Mao Tse-tung pointed out, "In the historical course of the Chinese revolution two steps must be taken: first, the democratic revolution, and secondly, the socialist revolution."² Although in its social character the first stage of, or the first step taken in, the Chinese revolution, is still fundamentally bourgeois-democratic, "yet it no longer belongs to the old type of revolution led by the bourgeoisie with the aim of establishing a capitalist society and a state under bourgeois dictatorship, but belongs to the new type of revolution which, led by the proletariat, aims at establishing a new-democratic society and a state under the joint dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes."³

Mao Tse-tung defined this revolution in the following simple and clear-cut formula: "A new-democratic revolution is a revolution of the broad masses of the people led by the proletariat and directed against imperialism and feudalism."⁴ In some instances, he also referred to it as a "people's democratic revolution against imperialism and the feudal forces". Owing to the fact that during their long years of counter-revolutionary rule, the Four Big Families⁵ headed by Chiang Kai-shek became a monopolistic clique of bureaucrat-capitalists, a new element was added to the character of the revolution. This was

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, London, Vol. III, p. 118.

² *Ibid.*, p. 109.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 111-12.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

⁵ Referring to the four big cliques of monopoly capitalists represented by Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung, Chen Li-fu and his brother, Chen Kuo-fu.

opposition to bureaucrat-capitalism. Mao Tse-tung added this new element to his formula which thus became: "The revolution against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism waged by the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat."¹ He regarded this formula as the general line and general policy in the first stage of the Chinese revolution.

"The broad masses of the people" in the formula proposed by Mao Tse-tung refers mainly to the peasants. This revolution was based on the alliance of workers and peasants and embraced all people who were opposed to imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism. According to Mao Tse-tung, the proletariat, the peasants, the intellectuals and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie in China were the basic forces which, with the proletariat as the leading force, would determine her fate.

The revolutionary democratic dictatorship established by this revolution, of course, rested upon the same class foundation. Mao Tse-tung called it "the joint dictatorship of all revolutionary classes under the leadership of the proletariat", or "the people's democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the working class . . . and based upon the alliance of workers and peasants".²

According to Mao Tse-tung, the question of proletarian leadership was the key by which a series of problems of the Chinese revolution could be solved. It was also the key which would decide the success or failure of the Chinese revolution. In May 1937, when speaking on the

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Peking, Vol. IV, p. 238.

² *Ibid.*, p. 422.

question of the anti-Japanese national united front, Mao Tse-tung said:

Is the proletariat to follow the bourgeoisie, or is the bourgeoisie to follow the proletariat? This question of the responsibility of leadership in the Chinese revolution is the pivot upon which the success of the revolution depends.¹

In his famous work *On People's Democratic Dictatorship* published in 1949, he again pointed out:

The entire history of revolution proves that without the leadership of the working class revolution fails and that with the leadership of the working class revolution triumphs. In the epoch of imperialism, in no country can any other class lead any genuine revolution to victory. This is clearly proved by the fact that the many revolutions led by China's petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie all failed.²

At the same time, Mao Tse-tung regarded the peasant question as the core of the question concerning proletarian leadership.

In his report on the national and colonial questions made at the Second Congress of the Communist International, Lenin proposed:

It would be utopian to think that proletarian parties, if indeed they can arise in such countries, could pursue Communist tactics and a Communist policy in these backward countries without having definite relations

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, London, Vol. I, p. 269.

² Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Peking, Vol. IV, p. 421.

with the peasant movement and without effectively supporting it.¹

Stalin pointed out on several occasions, ". . . in essence, the national question is a peasant question."²

Mao Tse-tung's view on the Chinese question was precisely in line with the views of Lenin and Stalin and was a development of these views.

In bourgeois-democratic revolutions, the main controversial question between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and between the proletariat and all other parties, has been the peasant question. In his work *On Coalition Government*, Mao Tse-tung pointed out:

Rallying all the forces at its command, the Kuo-mintang's anti-popular clique has aimed at the Chinese Communist Party all kinds of poisoned darts, open darts as well as secret, military as well as political, those that cause bloodshed as well as those that do not. Viewed from its social implications, the point of controversy between the two parties really hinges on the issue of agrarian relationships.³

Leadership in the peasant revolution is the chief hallmark of the leadership of the proletariat. The bourgeoisie cannot become the leader of a bourgeois-democratic revolution chiefly because it cannot lead a peasant revolution, and because it fears and opposes such a revolution. There is no doubt that only under the leadership of the proletariat, is it possible to effectively organize the enormous, disunited peasant population into an inexhaust-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, Eng. ed., Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1938, Vol. X, pp. 240-41.

² J. V. Stalin, *op. cit.*, Vol. VII, p. 72.

³ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, London, Vol. IV, p. 294.

ible fighting force, to form an alliance of workers and peasants, and on the basis of this alliance, win over all potential revolutionary forces to our side, and forge unity between the revolutionary forces in China and those in other parts of the world.

During the first revolutionary period Chen Tu-hsiu maintained that "if the bourgeois-democratic revolution loses the support of the bourgeoisie, it will cease to have any class significance and social basis in the revolutionary cause". That is to say, he regarded "the class significance and social basis" of the bourgeois-democratic revolution as pertaining to the bourgeoisie only. He did not take the peasant question into account. (See Chen Tu-hsiu's article, "The Bourgeois Revolution and the Revolutionary Bourgeoisie," published in 1923.) It should be pointed out that it was in connection with the peasant question that the opportunists of every description, beginning with Chen Tu-hsiu, opposed and misrepresented the leadership of the proletariat. Some of them directly denied the leadership of the proletariat and acknowledged that of the bourgeoisie, and thus directly rejected the peasant revolution, as did Chen Tu-hsiu and his followers in the first revolutionary period and the Right opportunists in the initial stage of the War of Resistance Against Japan. Others maintained an ultra-Left appearance but in practice actually denied the necessity for uniting with the middle peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie, so that in reality they denied the leadership of the proletariat, as did the "Left" opportunists during the period of the Ten-Year Civil War from 1927 to 1937.

There is no doubt that it was precisely the leadership of the proletariat and the consequent alliance of workers and peasants which made possible, on the one hand, the

victory of the revolution against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism; as Mao Tse-tung puts it, "These two classes are the main force in overthrowing imperialism and the Kuomintang reactionaries."¹ On the other hand, they made it possible for the transition of the new-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution; as Mao Tse-tung says, "The transition from New Democracy to socialism also depends mainly upon their alliance."²

If we had followed the line of the opportunists who surrendered the leadership of the proletariat, then, as historical facts have indicated, the revolution would have suffered reverses and defeat, the Chinese revolution would not have become what it is today, and would have had no future.

V. FROM REVOLUTIONARY BASES IN THE COUNTRYSIDE TO THE NATION-WIDE VICTORY OF THE REVOLUTION

As is generally known, the Chinese revolution triumphed after a long and bitter struggle and by capturing one bastion after another. After 1927, the capture of these bastions did not start in the big cities but in the countryside. At that time, the Communist Party of China, represented by Mao Tse-tung, shifted the centre of gravity of its work to the villages, gathered strength in the villages, and used them to encircle and then take

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Peking, Vol. IV, p. 421.

² *Ibid.*

the cities. This was the line of work upon which Mao Tse-tung insisted. Facts have long since proved that this line has brought complete victory because it was the correct line and the only one.

It was based upon a sound, scientific Marxist-Leninist analysis of conditions in China.

The enemies of the Chinese revolution were numerous and powerful. As early as May 1927, Stalin said:

... the enemies of the Chinese revolution — both internal (Chang Tso-lin, Chiang Kai-shek, the big bourgeoisie, the gentry, the landlords, etc.) and external (the imperialists) — are too numerous and too strong¹. . . .

In analysing the enemies of the revolution, which included not only powerful imperialist countries but also strong feudal forces and the big bourgeoisie which was in collusion with imperialism and the feudal forces and was hostile to the people, Mao Tse-tung raised a series of questions as follows:

Confronted with such enemies, the Chinese revolution becomes protracted and ruthless in nature. Since the enemies are extremely powerful, the revolutionary forces, unless allowed a long period of time, cannot be massed and steeled into a power that will finally crush them. Since the enemy's suppression of the Chinese revolution is exceedingly ruthless, the revolutionary forces cannot hold their own positions and take over the enemy's unless they steel themselves and develop their tenacity. The view that the forces of the Chinese revolution can be built up in the twinkling of an eye

¹ J. V. Stalin, *op. cit.*, Vol. IX, p. 258.

and the Chinese revolutionary struggle can triumph overnight is therefore incorrect.

Confronted with such enemies, the Chinese revolution must, so far as its principal means or the principal form is concerned, be an armed rather than a peaceful one. This is because our enemy makes it impossible for the Chinese people, deprived of all political freedoms and rights, to take any peaceful political action. Stalin said, "In China, armed revolution is fighting against armed counter-revolution. This is one of the peculiarities and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution." This is a perfectly correct formulation. The view which belittles armed struggle, revolutionary war, guerrilla war and army work is therefore incorrect.

Confronted with such enemies, the Chinese revolution has also to tackle the question of revolutionary base areas. Since powerful imperialism and its allies, the reactionary forces in China, have occupied China's key cities for a long time, if the revolutionary forces do not wish to compromise with them but want to carry on the struggle staunchly, and if they intend to accumulate strength and steel themselves and avoid decisive battles with their powerful enemy before they have mustered enough strength, then they must build the backward villages into advanced, consolidated base areas, into great military, political, economic and cultural revolutionary bastions, so that they can fight the fierce enemy who utilizes the cities to attack the rural districts and, through a protracted struggle, gradually win an over-all victory for the revolution.¹

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, London, Vol. III, pp. 84-85.

The establishment of revolutionary bases by armed force was the starting point of the road along which Mao Tse-tung guided the Chinese revolution to nation-wide victory. He pointed out that it was necessary to establish revolutionary bases even if in the beginning they were only several small pieces of territory; and that if this course was followed, then "a single spark could start a prairie fire". He said:

Only thus can we win the confidence of the revolutionary masses throughout the country, just as the Soviet Union has done throughout the world. Only thus can we create tremendous difficulties for the reactionary ruling classes, shake their very foundations, and precipitate their internal disintegration. And only thus can we really create a Red Army that will be our chief weapon in the coming great revolution. In short, only thus can we accelerate the revolutionary upsurge.¹

Why was there the possibility of establishing bases which could exist for a long time and why could this possibility be turned into reality? Mao Tse-tung pointed out the following conditions existing in old China:

The unevenness of political and economic development in China — the co-existence of a frail capitalist economy and a preponderant semi-feudal economy; the co-existence of a few modern industrial and commercial cities and the boundless expanses of stagnant rural districts; the co-existence of several millions of industrial workers on the one hand and, on the other, hundreds of millions of peasants and handicraftsmen under the old regime; the co-existence of big warlords

¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 117.

controlling the Central government and small warlords controlling the provinces; the co-existence of two kinds of reactionary armies, *i.e.*, the so-called Central army under Chiang Kai-shek and the troops of miscellaneous brands under the warlords in the provinces; and the co-existence of a few railway and steamship lines and motor roads on the one hand and, on the other, the vast number of wheelbarrow paths and trails for pedestrians only, many of which are even difficult for them to negotiate.

China is a semi-colonial country — the disunity among the imperialist countries has caused the disunity among the various ruling blocs in China. A semi-colonial state controlled by several countries is different from a colony controlled by a single country.

China is a vast country — “When the east is still dark, the west is lit up; when night falls in the south, the day breaks in the north”; hence one need not worry about whether there is room enough to move round.

China has gone through a great revolution which has provided us with the seeds of the Red Army, the Chinese Communist Party which leads the Red Army, and the masses who have participated in a revolution.¹

With special emphasis Mao Tse-tung pointed out the splits and wars within the camp of the comprador and feudal rulers who were manipulated by imperialism. He stated:

The prolonged splits and wars within the White regime provide the condition that one or several small

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

Red areas under the leadership of the Communist Party can emerge and hold out amid the encirclement of the White political power. . . . If only we realize that splits and wars are incessant within the White regime in China, we shall have no doubt about the emergence, existence and daily growth of the Red political power.¹

It can be seen from the foregoing that by applying to semi-colonial China the law governing the uneven economic and political development in various capitalist countries as expounded by Lenin and Stalin, and by making a concrete analysis of the concrete conditions, Mao Tse-tung drew a series of comprehensive conclusions. These were that, the economic and political development of China was extremely uneven; that this uneven development gave rise to extreme unevenness in the development of the revolution; that it was possible for the revolution to take advantage of the weakness of the enemy to win victory first in the rural areas, and that it was possible to establish long-term revolutionary bases there.

Obviously, after the defeat of the revolution in 1927, these conclusions of Mao Tse-tung were of enormous significance to the revolutionary cause of China. He recalled in 1936:

We pointed this out (at the First Party Conference of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area) when, in late 1927 and early 1928 soon after guerrilla warfare was started in China, some comrades in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area — the Ching Kang Mountains — raised the question: "How long can the Red flag be kept flying?" For this was a most fundamental question; without answering

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

the question whether China's revolutionary base areas and the Chinese Red Army could exist and develop, we would not advance a single step.¹

The march of the revolutionary forces led by Comrade Mao Tse-tung to the Ching Kang Mountains constituted an extremely heroic attack against the counter-revolution of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei.² This attack gave birth to the first revolutionary base. The establishment of this revolutionary base when the people were suffering extreme hardship inspired the whole nation with hope, and many other revolutionary bases were established in its wake.

After the defeat of the revolution in 1927, the Chen Tu-hsiu capitulationist clique immediately lost faith in the future of the revolution and became liquidationists. They opposed Mao Tse-tung's line and the heroic march he led to attack the counter-revolution. Their former denial of the peasant revolution already constituted the basis for their merging with the Trotskyite clique and they soon collaborated with the Trotskyites with the result that they were expelled from the Party. The members of the Trotskyite-Chen Tu-hsiu clique tried their best to popularize the reactionary rule of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang and the strength of the Kuomintang reactionaries. They even became so shameless as to laud Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary war

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 193-94.

² Wang Ching-wei was a notorious Kuomintang leader and pro-Japanese traitor. He openly surrendered to the Japanese invaders in December 1938 (during the War of Resistance Against Japan) when he was vice-chairman of the Kuomintang and chairman of its People's Political Council. In March 1940 he became president of the puppet central government then formed in Nanking. He died in Japan in November 1944.

as a "war of unification" and openly declared themselves to be "at one with reaction". They cursed Mao Tse-tung and the revolution with much venom. All along, this handful of people who degenerated into the most despicable counter-revolutionary trash did the dirtiest work for imperialism and counter-revolution.

On the other hand, some comrades in our Party committed the mistake of being impetuous, a fault peculiar to petty-bourgeois revolutionaries. They hated the Kuomintang's policy of massacre bitterly and were enraged by Chen Tu-hsiu's capitulation. However, they lacked the patience to carry on protracted, arduous and delicate revolutionary struggles and became impatient with the task of holding on to the revolutionary bases in the countryside for a long period of time. They initiated the theory that the revolution could gain a quick victory. These comrades actually denied the unevenness of China's economic and political development; they denied the unevenness in the development of the revolution and dreamed that it could gain complete victory overnight or that they could win a signal victory quickly by capturing many cities. This "Left" adventurism gained temporary ascendancy in the Party on three occasions,¹ when, the correct line of Mao

¹ After the defeat of the revolution in 1927, on three occasions "Left" opportunist mistakes arose in the central leading body of the Chinese Communist Party. The first "Left" opportunist line existed between the winter of 1927 and the spring of 1928. Erroneously appraised that the revolutionary tide was still rising, its advocates refused to recognize the defeat of the revolution, opposed any retreat and demanded continued attacks. Their error caused a great deal of damage to the revolutionary forces which had been preserved after the defeat of the revolution in 1927. The second "Left" opportunist line, generally called Li Li-san's line, was dominant for about four months beginning from June 1930 when its representative, Li Li-san, headed the

Tse-tung being rejected, the revolution suffered losses. The third adventurist line represented by Wang Ming (Chen Shao-yu) and Po Ku (Chin Pang-hsien) particularly, which held sway in the Party after the adventurist line of Li Li-san, caused the most severe losses. It was again due to the leadership of Mao Tse-tung that the revolution was eventually saved from the critical situation created by such adventurism.

As the revolutionary bases were established and preserved through armed struggle, the question concerning revolutionary bases was connected with the strategic problems of the revolutionary war. Actually the controversy over the question concerning revolutionary bases was a controversy over the strategic problems of the revolutionary war.

Party's central leadership. The advocates of this line denied the need to gather mass strength in the revolution and refused to recognize the uneven development of the Chinese revolution. They called for uprisings throughout the country and the seizure of metropolitan cities, as opposed to Mao Tse-tung's idea that for a long period of time the main effort should be devoted to the establishment of rural base areas so as to use them to encircle the cities and win nation-wide victory. The third "Left" opportunist line which held sway from January 1931 to January 1935 was advocated by a group of leading comrades in the Party's Central Committee who had no experience in actual revolutionary struggle. Setting themselves against the correct line of Mao Tse-tung, they put forward a new political programme which actually restored and developed Li Li-san's line, in a fresh form, as well as other "Leftist" ideas and policies. The third "Left" opportunist line resulted in the loss of 90 per cent of the Party's organizations, of the Chinese Red Army and its base areas, subjected millions of people in the revolutionary bases to the tyrannical rule of the Kuomintang and retarded the progress of the Chinese revolution. Through long years of practical experience, however, most of the comrades who committed this "Leftist" error realized and rectified their mistakes.

One of the greatest military contribution made by Mao Tse-tung was that, in the long process of the Chinese revolution, he placed the guerrilla warfare of the revolution in an extremely important strategic position. He pointed out:

... the protracted revolutionary struggle conducted in such revolutionary base areas is chiefly a peasant guerrilla war led by the Chinese Communist Party. To neglect building up revolutionary base areas in the rural districts, to neglect performing arduous work among the peasants, and to neglect guerrilla war, are therefore all incorrect views.¹

Because during the Ten-Year Civil War period the "Left" opportunists ignored the importance of holding on to the rural bases for a long time, they inevitably ignored guerrilla warfare and the line of achieving great victories by an accumulation of small ones. They did not recognize that guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare of a guerrilla character were the main forms of fighting and dreamed of fighting decisive battles of positional warfare under conditions where the enemy's strength was much greater than ours. The disastrous results brought about by this erroneous strategy led to the loss of the bases. Then, when their theory of gaining a quick victory did not lead to success but, on the contrary, to the loss of many bases, these "Left" opportunists became pessimistic and deviated to the Right. In the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, they again advocated the strategy of a quick victory. They showed no interest in the policy of persisting in the establishment of anti-

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, London, Vol. III, pp. 85-86.

Japanese bases in the countryside and anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare and of extending the bases vigorously and on a large scale. As for the policy of operations by the people's armed forces they were intolerant of anything short of "regular warfare", disregarding the fact that the enemy's strength was much greater than ours in the initial stages of the war. All this was similar to the policy that they had advocated during the Ten-Year Civil War period. The difference was that, in the period of the War of Resistance, they fully demonstrated that they had lost confidence in the strength of the people. Pinning their hopes of victory in the War of Resistance mainly on the "regular warfare" waged by the Kuomintang army, they failed to see the great role and future of the people's armed forces.

The method of conducting guerrilla warfare as expounded by Mao Tse-tung was, in some cases, "to break up the whole into parts" and "to divide up the forces in order to arouse the masses", while, in others, it was "to gather parts into a whole" and "to concentrate the forces to deal with the enemy". The main strategy of the revolutionary war as expounded by him was to develop extensive guerrilla warfare to the fullest possible extent and then, under certain conditions, with the growth of our strength, to turn it into regular warfare, as was done in the latter period of the Ten-Year Civil War. During this period, regular warfare still took the form of mobile warfare of a guerrilla character. Under other conditions, in accordance with changes in the enemy's situation regular warfare was changed to guerrilla warfare, as in the first period of the War of Resistance Against Japan. During that period, the main form of fighting was guerrilla warfare but the chance of waging mobile

warfare under favourable conditions was not abandoned. Then owing to new conditions, the further growth of the revolutionary force and changes in the enemy's situation, guerrilla warfare was again changed to regular warfare, as in the last stage of the War of Resistance Against Japan and during the War of Liberation against U.S. imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek. In the latter period of the War of Liberation, regular warfare developed to such an extent that it included the operations of large formations in which great numbers of heavy arms were employed and attacks were launched on strongly fortified points. At the same time as all these strategic changes occurred, other changes took place in the revolutionary bases — small bases changed to large ones, these bases in turn extended to areas which included cities, until victory was established over half of China and then throughout the country.

After the revolution had achieved nation-wide victory, Mao Tse-tung pointed out the necessity of building a completely modern army in order to defend our motherland. In his opening speech at the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in September 1949, he said:

Our national defence must be consolidated and no imperialists will be allowed to invade our territory again. Our people's armed forces must be preserved and strengthened, with our heroic and tested People's Liberation Army as their foundation. We will not only have a powerful army but we shall also have a powerful air force and a powerful navy.

The seizure of our territory Taiwan by U.S. imperialism and its aggression against the Korean Democratic Peo-

ple's Republic have demonstrated fully, as Mao Tse-tung pointed out two years previously how necessary it is to build modern national defence forces. While sending volunteers to fight triumphantly shoulder to shoulder with the Korean People's Army against U.S. aggression, the Chinese people are doing their best to build a completely modern army, a powerful air force and navy.

Mao Tse-tung applied Marxist-Leninist dialectics to the strategic problems of the revolutionary war with exceptional brilliance, and step by step proved this dialectical analysis to be correct. However, the opportunists and dogmatists, always ignoring the balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy, laid one-sided stress on "regular warfare". They ignored the dialectics in life, and, therefore, life brought them nothing but suffering.

VI. A BROAD UNITED FRONT OF BOTH UNITY AND STRUGGLE

For centuries, China was an agricultural country, but in recent times, suffering from the aggressive actions of various imperialist powers, it became an extremely tumultuous, semi-colonial country and, as previously mentioned, the focal point of the numerous contradictions in the East. It was therefore possible for China's new-democratic revolution against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism to take full advantage of these contradictions and concentrate all its forces to defeat the people's enemies one by one.

In this connection, two kinds of mistakes occurred in the history of the Communist Party of China. One

was Right opportunism: for instance, that of Chen Tu-hsiu during the period of the 1924-27 revolution, and the Rightist mistake committed by some comrades in the early period of the War of Resistance Against Japan. The Right opportunists advocated an unprincipled united front, attempting to turn the proletariat into an appendage of the bourgeoisie. Mao Tse-tung called this mistake of Right opportunism "all alliance and no struggle". Another mistake was that of "Left" opportunism which was made on three occasions during the Ten-Year Civil War period. Those who committed this mistake rejected a united front of any kind, thus isolating the proletariat, the farm labourers and the poor peasants. Mao Tse-tung called this mistake of "Left" opportunism "all struggle and no alliance".

Obviously it was very wrong to deny the possibility of a broad united front during the Chinese revolution and the necessity for it under certain conditions. In August 1927, when refuting the Trotskyites' position regarding China, Stalin pointed out that the basic premise of Leninism in its approach to the questions of the revolutionary movements in colonial and dependent countries consisted of a strict distinction between revolution in imperialist countries and revolution in countries that suffered from the imperialist oppression of other states. The bourgeoisie in the former countries is different from the national bourgeoisie in the latter. The difference is that the bourgeoisie in imperialist country is the oppressor of other nations, being "counter-revolutionary at all stages of the revolution", while the national bourgeoisie in countries oppressed by imperialism, "at a certain stage

and for a certain period, may support the revolutionary movement of its country against imperialism".¹

In other words, it is possible, under certain historical conditions, for the proletariat in the colonial and semi-colonial countries to establish a revolutionary united front with the national bourgeoisie.

Of course, in this united front, the proletariat must not obscure its independent stand and must definitely maintain the independence of the proletarian movement. The proletariat must establish its own leading position in the united front. This principle was also laid down by Lenin and Stalin.

In accordance with the experience of the Chinese revolution, especially the Communist Party's experience in establishing a united front with the Kuomintang, Mao Tse-tung developed these views of Lenin and Stalin and created a set of comprehensive and correct policies concerning the united front in the Chinese revolution.

Mao Tse-tung called the Chinese Communist Party's policy of the united front with the bourgeoisie, especially its policy towards the big bourgeoisie represented by the Kuomintang in the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, as one of both unity and struggle. The reason why it called for both unity and struggle was that the Chinese bourgeoisie possessed a dual character. The "Left" sectarians did not realize the dual character of the Chinese bourgeoisie and therefore denied the possibility and necessity for unity; the Right opportunists also did not realize this dual character and therefore denied the necessity for struggle. The correct policy formulated by Mao Tse-tung was precisely to carry out

¹ J. V. Stalin, *op. cit.*, Vol. X, p. 11.

a resolute and serious struggle on two fronts against both Right and "Left" opportunism.

These two forms of opportunism are not equally dangerous to the revolution at all times. The history of the Chinese revolution proves that before the united front with the bourgeoisie was formed, "Left" sectarianism was the main danger to the Party; but after the united front was formed, Right capitulationism often constituted the main danger. For instance, during the Second Revolutionary Civil War period from 1927 to 1937, the "Left" opportunists even denied the possibility and necessity for a united front with the petty bourgeoisie in general. They regarded some small parties of the petty bourgeoisie and some sections of the national bourgeoisie that were not in power as the most dangerous enemies of the revolution. In 1931, as a result of the occupation of Northeast China by Japanese imperialists certain changes took place in the political relations of classes in China, but there was still no change in the views of the "Left" opportunists. This "Leftist" mistake constituted the main danger at that time because it hindered the Party from linking itself with the broad masses and from taking full advantage of the various contradictions to facilitate the revolution. But after the anti-Japanese national united front was formed in 1937, some comrades represented by Chen Shao-yu, who had committed "Leftist" mistakes, then committed Rightist mistake. The Rightist mistake constituted the main danger at that time because it hindered the Party from struggling against the reactionaries and the reactionary trends in the united front and exposed the proletariat to the danger of losing its independence.

During the War of Resistance Against Japan the united front even included the ruling Kuomintang clique represented by Chiang Kai-shek; this clique consisted of the big pro-Anglo-American landlords and big bourgeoisie who, for ten years, had carried on a cruel war against the Communist Party. It was necessary to include this clique in the united front because at that time it possessed a large army, and there were contradictions between U.S. imperialism and Japanese imperialism in their fight for supremacy in the Far East. After this broad anti-Japanese united front was formed, using the method of class analysis, Mao Tse-tung pointed out that within this united front, there were three different groups — the left wing, the middle-of-the-roaders and the right wing. He proposed the policy of extending and consolidating the left wing, urging the middle-of-the-roaders to progress and change and isolating the right wing, or in other words, a policy of “developing the progressive forces, winning over the middle-of-the-road forces and isolating the die-hard forces”. But those comrades who committed Rightist mistakes opposed the policy of Mao Tse-tung. Ignoring the class distinctions in the united front, and in opposition to the policy of Mao Tse-tung, they proposed to make “no distinction between the left wing, the middle-of-the-roaders and the right wing”, and denied the existence of fascism in China. They even ignored the class distinction between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang, regarding both parties as “the confluence of most of the excellent, progressive Chinese youth”. (See “The Key to Saving the Present Situation” by Chen Shao-yu, published in December 1937.) The Rightist views actually served to protect the die-hard forces represented by Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang.

The comrades who committed Rightist mistakes denied the principle of "independence in the united front" as proposed by Mao Tse-tung in the period of the War of Resistance, and in fact advocated that everything must be done through Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang government. Militarily, they advocated "unifying the command, organization, armed forces, discipline, operation plans and action". Actually this was tantamount to merging the people's army led by the Communist Party into the army of the Kuomintang and allowing Chiang Kai-shek to swallow it up as he pleased. It completely fell in with the counter-revolutionary demand which Chiang Kai-shek made later for the so-called "unification of the military command and government administration". Just as Mao Tse-tung said, these comrades were "making concessions to the Kuomintang's anti-popular policies, having more confidence in the Kuomintang than in the masses, not daring to arouse and give full rein to mass struggles, not daring to expand the Liberated Areas and the people's armies in the Japanese-occupied areas, and handing over the leadership in the War of Resistance to the Kuomintang".¹

When explaining the principle of "independence in the united front", Mao Tse-tung said:

What then is our purpose in upholding that principle? In one aspect, it is to maintain the foothold that we have already gained. This foothold is the starting point of our strategy, and its loss would mean the end of everything. But the chief purpose lies in another aspect, namely, to expand one foothold, to realize the positive aim of "mobilizing millions upon millions of

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Peking, Vol. IV, p. 171.

the masses to join the Anti-Japanese National United Front and overthrow Japanese imperialism.”¹

The principles laid down by Mao Tse-tung with regard to political problems and those of war strategy, and the series of policies formulated in accordance with these principles were to lead to the general aim of turning the outcome of the War of Resistance into a victory for the people. These principles and policies were certainly decisive in bringing about such a victory.

However, as the Rightist views and policies led first of all to the abandonment of the positions that had been taken already, their expansion was therefore out of the question. Consequently, the comrades who committed Rightist mistakes could not but draw a conclusion directly opposite to that of Mao Tse-tung. For instance, in his article “The Key to Saving the Present Situation”, Chen Shao-yu made the following estimate of the perspective in the War of Resistance:

The present situation in China is like this: If the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China, through their co-operation, can drive out the Japanese invaders and gain victory, then the Kuomintang will in fact prove itself the biggest political party fighting for the national existence of the Chinese people, and the leader of the Kuomintang Mr. Chiang Kai-shek and other persons who firmly lead the War of Resistance will be eternally honoured as national heroes of China. When that time comes, who can violate the will of the Chinese people and carry on a struggle to overthrow the Kuomintang? . . .

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, London, Vol. II, p. 113.

Therefore, it can be seen that those who believe in the rumour that "after victory in the War of Resistance, China will belong to the Communist Soviet" are not only unfamiliar with the actual situation in China but also have no confidence in the fighting strength and brilliant perspectives of the Kuomintang. Obviously this is a very harmful thing.

According to this opinion, after winning the victory in the war against Japan, China would still remain under the rule of Chiang Kai-shek's most reactionary Kuomintang and would not be a People's Democracy led by the Communist Party. This was the inevitable and logical conclusion derived from a series of incorrect views and policies of the Right deviationists at that time. This ignominious conclusion was indeed very harmful to the fighting strength and brilliant perspectives of the Chinese people. Through their militant life, however, the Chinese people had long since discarded this ignominious conclusion. Entirely contrary to Chen Shao-yu's estimate, Chiang Kai-shek turned out to be nothing but a traitor "whom every citizen considers punishable by death", while the true national heroes, who will always light up the way of advance for the Chinese people and who will be eternally honoured by them, are the innumerable Communist Party members and people's warriors who have performed heart-stirring exploits for the revolution. Thus it is clear that it was none other than the Right deviationists who were themselves most unfamiliar with and wholly ignorant of the actual situation in China.

The comrades who committed Rightist mistakes hoped to maintain unity with Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang by unilateral, passive concessions. This was utterly wrong. Contrary to these comrades, Mao Tse-tung adopted a

policy of active struggle as a means of uniting all the anti-Japanese forces. He said:

In the period of the anti-Japanese united front, struggles are the means to solidarity and solidarity is the aim of struggles. . . . solidarity is realized through struggles and destroyed through concessions.¹

The events that took place in the country throughout the period of the War of Resistance fully confirmed this truth as stated by Mao Tse-tung. In the united front, our Party, adhering to the policy of Mao Tse-tung, resolutely adopted a dual revolutionary policy of both unity and struggle to cope with the double-dealing policy of the Kuomintang big bourgeoisie, which was to resist Japan while at the same time preparing to surrender, and to unite with the Communist Party while at the same time trying to destroy it. As a result, our Party was able to mobilize the people fully, unite all possible forces that were against Japan, stabilize the vacillating elements, isolate the die-hards, repulse Chiang Kai-shek's several anti-Communist campaigns, and consequently persist in the War of Resistance, and maintain the anti-Japanese united front to the very end.

On the one hand, the Right deviationists completely failed to understand that our united front with Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang during the period of the War of Resistance was built upon the basis of the people's armed forces. Chiang Kai-shek was compelled to join the united front. If there had been no people's armed forces, Chiang Kai-shek would certainly not have established any kind of united front with us. On the other hand, the Right

¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 194.

deviationists completely failed to understand that after it had been compelled to establish a united front with us, Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, relying on its counter-revolutionary armed forces, constantly attempted to use every means and every chance to attack us and to eliminate the Communist Party and the people's armed forces. Therefore we had to rely on the armed forces of the people in order to carry out justifiable, expedient and restrained struggles against such counter-revolutionary attacks by Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang. Mao Tse-tung criticized the mistakes of the Right deviationists on these two basic points, pointing out that this alliance against Japan was mainly an alliance of armed forces, that there were bound to be struggles within the anti-Japanese united front. When Chiang Kai-shek, in collusion with the Japanese aggressors, launched armed attacks upon the people's armed forces and the anti-Japanese bases, Mao Tse-tung stated, we must not let him run wild but must carry on such necessary armed struggles in self-defence as were justifiable, expedient and restrained. As a matter of fact, when, in co-ordination with the Japanese aggressors, Chiang Kai-shek did launch the three anti-Communist campaigns in the form of armed attacks, the Communist Party of China was not daunted by these counter-revolutionary assaults but, on the contrary, resolutely repulsed them and thus safeguarded the people's armed forces and the anti-Japanese bases and won the War of Resistance.

On the question of struggling against the Kuomintang die-hards in the anti-Japanese united front, besides the Rightist view that "struggles would split up the united front", there was the "Leftist" view that struggles should be waged without limit, and incorrect tactics adopted

towards the middle-of-the-roaders. Mao Tse-tung criticized not only the Rightist but also the "Leftist" view. It was precisely for the purpose of preventing any ultra-Left mistakes at the time that he laid down his three well-known principles in the struggle against the Kuo-mintang die-hards, namely, the principle of "justifiability", of "expediency", and of "restraint" (meaning that a struggle should stop at the opportune moment). Mao Tse-tung pointed out:

Persisting in such justifiable, expedient and restrained struggles, we can develop the progressive forces, win over the middle-of-the-road forces, isolate the die-hard forces and make the die-hards chary of heedlessly attacking us, or heedlessly compromising with the enemy, or heedlessly starting a large-scale civil war.¹

Such a policy of unity with the bourgeois die-hards as well as struggle against them in the national united front is an embodiment of "the consistency of the national struggle with the class struggle",² a principle explained by Mao Tse-tung. This is the art of revolution — the Marxist-Leninist art of revolution — which Mao Tse-tung has practised very successfully. During the War of Resistance, this policy of his succeeded, to the greatest degree possible, in isolating the die-hard forces, winning over the middle-of-the-roaders and developing the progressive forces. This fully prepared the Communist Party and the people ideologically, politically, organizationally and militarily, so that after the surrender of Japan, within two or three years, the Communist

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 264.

Party of China was able to lead the people systematically and steadily to smash the counter-revolutionary war launched by U.S. imperialism and its lackey Chiang Kai-shek against the Chinese people, overthrow the last counter-revolutionary dynasty in China headed by Chiang Kai-shek and win the victory for which the Chinese people had been striving for a hundred years.

During the War of Resistance, the national bourgeoisie, or the middle bourgeoisie, constituted the middle-of-the-roads between the workers, peasants and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie on the one hand and the big landlords and big bourgeoisie represented by Chiang Kai-shek on the other. The Communist Party of China adopted a policy of winning over the middle-of-the-roads. Mao Tse-tung explained the situation as follows:

Although as a class it (the national bourgeoisie — *Translator*) is in contradiction with the workers and does not approve of the independence of the working class, yet, being oppressed by Japanese imperialism in the enemy-occupied areas and restricted by the big landlords and the big bourgeois in the areas under the Kuomintang rule, it still wants to resist Japan and win political power for itself. On the question of resistance to Japan, it favours solidarity in resistance; and on the question of winning political power, it favours the movement for constitutionalism and attempts to achieve its objective by exploiting the contradictions between the progressives and the die-hards. It is a stratum that we must win over.¹

A policy of uniting with the national bourgeoisie was adopted in so far as it tended to side with the revolution

¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. III, pp. 195-96.

and a policy of criticizing it was adopted in so far as it vacillated and was prone to compromise. This policy of criticism was another form of struggle but different from that waged against the Kuomintang die-hards, because the national bourgeoisie was not in power. It was, nevertheless, also a policy of unity and struggle, which aimed at making the national bourgeoisie stand firm in the struggle against imperialism.

After the conclusion of the War of Resistance the national bourgeoisie continued to suffer, being restricted and oppressed by the big landlords and bureaucrat-bourgeoisie (the big bourgeoisie) represented by Chiang Kai-shek. At the same time, as soon as Japanese imperialist oppression was ended, it was replaced by U.S. imperialist oppression, which also encroached upon the interests of the national bourgeoisie. This made it possible for the proletariat to maintain a united front with the national bourgeoisie. The question remained much the same: to adopt a policy of uniting with the national bourgeoisie in so far as it tended to side with the revolution and to adopt a policy of criticizing and struggling against it in so far as it wavered and was prone to compromise. Mao Tse-tung also pointed out that after the victory of the revolution it would still be necessary to maintain a united front with the national bourgeoisie in the economic field, because of the backwardness of China's economy.

Naturally, as he explained, the dual policy of both unity and struggle must also be adhered to in the economic united front. A policy of uniting with the bourgeoisie should be adopted in so far as it was keen to develop industrial production; while a policy of struggling against it should be adopted if and when it resorted to specula-

tion and monopoly, violated government laws and economic plans.

The events of the last few years have further proved the complete correctness of Mao Tse-tung's policy that "to counter imperialist oppression and to raise her backward economy to a higher level, China must utilize all the factors of urban and rural capitalism that are beneficial and not harmful to the national economy and the people's livelihood; and we must unite with the national bourgeoisie in common struggle".¹ Its correctness can be seen in the various financial and economic achievements of the People's Republic of China. It is even more evident in such massive people's movements as the movement to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, the suppression of the counter-revolutionaries and agrarian reform.

The events of the last few years have further given the lie to Right opportunism, because it attempted to sacrifice the independence and leading position of the proletariat in the united front and therefore would have inevitably sacrificed the victory of the people. These events have furthermore given the lie to "Left" opportunism because, at the time when it was necessary and possible to isolate the enemies of the revolution to the greatest extent, it tended to isolate the Party and thereby benefit the enemy.

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Peking, Vol. IV, p. 421.

VII. THE CONTINUOUS DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION INTO THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

Mao Tse-tung writes in his *On Coalition Government*:

We Communists never conceal our political stand. It is definite and beyond any doubt that our future or maximum programme is to head China for socialism and communism. Both the name of our Party and our Marxist world view unequivocally point to this ultimate ideal of the future, a future of incomparable brightness and beauty. Upon joining the Party, every Communist bears in his mind the struggle for two clearly defined objectives, namely, the new-democratic revolution at present and socialism and communism in the future, and this despite the animosity, calumny, vituperation and ridicule which, out of their ignorance and baseness, the enemies of communism level against us and which we must resolutely combat. As to the well-meaning sceptics, we should not attack them but explain things to them with goodwill and patience. All this is very clear, definite and unequivocal.¹

This paragraph gives a very clear picture of China's future, which, governed by the laws of world history as well as Chinese history, is absolutely inevitable.

The Right opportunists either could not see this future or regarded it as extremely uncertain and very distant. Because they regarded the bourgeoisie as the leader of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, they considered that the fruit of the revolution should go to the bourgeoisie

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, London, Vol. IV, p. 274.

alone. For instance, in his article "The Bourgeois Revolution and the Revolutionary Bourgeoisie", published in 1923, Chen Tu-hsiu wrote: "The victory in such a democratic revolution certainly means the victory of the bourgeoisie." From a Rightist point of view, he flatly denied the future of socialism. Conversely, the "Left" opportunists ignored the difference between the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the socialist revolution or considered that the victory of the revolution in one or several provinces would mark the beginning of its development into a socialist revolution. Or they considered that by the time the victory of the revolution had spread to the "essential part" of China, the fundamental task would be to carry out the socialist revolution and that the rule of the Kuomintang reactionaries and imperialism could be overthrown only on the basis of realizing socialism. From a "Leftist" viewpoint, those who were imbued with ultra-revolutionism flatly denied the possibility of the victory of the democratic revolution, thus denying in essence the possibility of the victory of socialism.

"Left" opportunism and Right opportunism are interchangeable on this question as on many others. As previously stated, when during the initial stage of the War of Resistance Against Japan our Party, led by Mao Tse-tung, was striving to prepare itself for every step in its task to turn the outcome of the War of Resistance into a victory for the people, those comrades who had committed "Leftist" mistakes during the period of the Second Revolutionary Civil War came to an entirely contrary conclusion. They considered that the victorious "future" of the War of Resistance belonged to Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang rather than to the people. This conclusion,

obviously, denied both the victorious future of the democratic revolution and the future of socialism.

After 1927, Mao Tse-tung repeatedly refuted the erroneous "Leftist" ideological trend in relation to the question of the character of the revolution. He considered that the Chinese democratic revolution must be carried out to the end, saying:

Only in this way can a socialist future of the Chinese revolution be fostered. Misconceptions such as denying this period of democratic revolution and considering that the opportune moment for a socialist revolution in China has arrived are extremely detrimental to the Chinese revolution.¹

Mao Tse-tung regarded the opinion then held by the Communist International that the character of the Chinese revolution remained bourgeois-democratic as completely correct. He said, "The struggle which we have gone through verifies the truth of the opinion of the Communist International."²

In the light of the concrete conditions in China, Mao Tse-tung developed the teachings of Lenin and Stalin regarding the continuous development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into the socialist revolution. He said:

We advocate the theory of the continuous development of revolution, but not the Trotskyite theory of a permanent revolution. We stand for the attainment of socialism through all the necessary stages of the

¹ *Resolution of the Sixth Congress of the Fourth Army of the Red Army* drafted by Mao Tse-tung, December 1928.

² *Ibid.*

democratic republic. We are opposed to tail-ism, but we are also opposed to adventurism and ultra-revolutionism.¹

He also said:

Every Communist must know that the whole Chinese revolutionary movement led by the Chinese Communist Party is a complete revolutionary movement embracing the two revolutionary stages, democratic and socialist, which are two revolutionary processes differing in character, and that the socialist stage can be reached only after the democratic stage is completed. The democratic revolution is the necessary preparation for the socialist revolution, and the socialist revolution is the inevitable trend of the democratic revolution. And the ultimate aim of all Communists is to strive for the final building of socialist society and communist society. We can give correct leadership to the Chinese revolution only on the basis of a clear understanding of both the differences between the democratic and socialist revolutions and their interconnections.²

Therefore, viewed from the development of the entire revolutionary movement, the period of the new-democratic revolution "is a transitional stage between putting an end to the colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society and establishing a socialist society".³

Why was such a continuous development and transition possible? In terms of class, it was due to the leadership of the proletariat; and in terms of party, it was

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, London, Vol. I, p. 279.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 101.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

due to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Mao Tse-tung was completely correct in pointing out:

Except for the Communist Party, none of the political parties, bourgeois or petty-bourgeois, is equal to the task of leading China's two great revolutions, democratic and socialist, to their complete realization. And the Chinese Communist Party, from the very day of its birth, has placed this twofold task upon its own shoulders.¹

As stated above, it is entirely wrong to mix the stage of democratic revolution with that of socialist revolution. On the other hand, this by no means implies that the stage of democratic revolution cannot include any socialist factors. To think so is equally wrong. In 1939, dealing with the result of the victory of the new-democratic revolution, Mao Tse-tung wrote:

It is an inevitable result of the victory of the democratic revolution in economically backward China that capitalism will develop to a certain degree. But this will be only the result of the Chinese revolution in one aspect, not its whole outcome. The whole outcome of the Chinese revolution will be the development of the capitalist factors on the one hand, and of the socialist factors on the other.²

Mao Tse-tung reached this conclusion precisely according to the basic standpoint of the leadership of the proletariat. Both political and economic developments

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

² *Ibid.*, p. 100.

following the victory of our new-democratic revolution have fully verified his Marxist-Leninist conclusion.

What is the chief socialist factor in the political sphere resulting from the victory of the new-democratic revolution? It is the leading position of the working class in the organs of state power and in the people's armed forces, as has been stipulated in the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

What is the chief socialist factor in the economic sphere resulting from the victory of the new-democratic revolution? It is the confiscation of enterprises owned by imperialists and bureaucrat-capitalists and the transfer of their ownership to the people's republic led by the working class. In the words of Mao Tse-tung, this "will enable the people's republic to control the economic lifelines of the country and will enable the state-owned economy to become the leading sector of the entire national economy. This sector of the economy is socialist, not capitalist, in character."¹ The Common Programme, in line with the views of Mao Tse-tung, has also made this point clear. It states:

State-owned economy is socialist in nature. All enterprises relating to the economic life of the country and exercising a dominant influence over the people's livelihood shall be under the unified operation of the state. All state-owned resources and enterprises are the public property of the people as a whole, are the main material basis on which the People's Republic will develop production and bring about economic prosperity, and are the leading force of the entire social economy.

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Peking, Vol. IV, p. 367.

The mutual-aid organizations, agricultural producers' co-operatives and supply and marketing co-operatives of the labouring masses of the peasants which have grown in the course of the new-democratic revolution also contain socialist factors and serve as transitional forms leading the peasants to socialism.

Our people's revolution has opened an extremely broad road for socialist development.

It is true that we need a considerable length of time to bring about socialist transformation throughout the country. But the way has been opened. Our progress is fully assured, though extensive preparations and struggles are still necessary. As Mao Tse-tung has pointed out:

Our country will thus steadily advance and pass through war and new-democratic reform; and in the future, when the economic and cultural prosperity of the country has been achieved, when various conditions are ready, and when agreement has been reached by the people throughout the country after mature deliberations, we shall embark upon the new era of socialism deliberately and properly.¹

The Right opportunists attempted to make a museum piece of the great ideal of communism, while the "Left" opportunists attempted to strip it of its rich, living flesh and blood. Taking into account all the stages which Chinese history had to traverse, Mao Tse-tung combined firmness in matters of communist principle with flexibility in matters of policy for the attainment of com-

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Closing Speech Delivered at the Second Session of the First National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.*

munism. Thus, communism in China is not utopian, or something unattainable; it is entirely attainable, irresistible and full of life.

VIII. THE BUILDING OF THE PARTY

The process through which Mao Tse-tung has integrated Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution is also the process through which the Communist Party of China has become increasingly Bolshevized.

How can all the correct lines of the Party be consistently carried out and become lines to guide the actions of the masses? How can all the possibilities which the Party points out and is struggling for be turned into realities? In the last analysis, these questions concern the Party itself.

Mao Tse-tung has often said that without a Bolshevized party of the Lenin-Stalin type, the victory of the Chinese revolution would be impossible. He points out:

If there is to be revolution, there must be a revolutionary party. Without a revolutionary party, without a party built on the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory and in the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary style, it is impossible to lead the working class and the broad masses of the people to defeat imperialism and its running dogs. In the more than one hundred years since the birth of Marxism, it was only through the example of the Russian Bolsheviks in leading the October Revolution, in leading socialist construc-

tion and in defeating fascist aggression that revolutionary parties of a new type were formed and developed in the world. With the birth of revolutionary parties of this type, the face of the world revolution has changed. The change has been so great that transformations utterly inconceivable to people of the older generation have come into being amid fire and thunder. The Communist Party of China is a party built and developed on the model of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. With the birth of the Communist Party of China, the face of the Chinese revolution took on an altogether new aspect.¹

Without a sound Marxist-Leninist theory, it would be impossible to have such a revolutionary party. As Lenin's maxim states: "The role of vanguard fighter can be fulfilled only by a party that is guided by the most advanced theory."² Stalin states in the conclusion of the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*: "Only a party which has mastered the Marxist-Leninist theory can confidently advance and lead the working class forward."³ Mao Tse-tung firmly believes that in order to be fully competent to shoulder a series of great historic tasks and to lead the Chinese people from one victory to another, our Party must first of all achieve Marxist-Leninist ideological unity in its own ranks, raise the ideological level of Marxism-Leninism in the whole Party and consolidate its correct

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Peking, Vol. IV, p. 284.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1961, Vol. V, p. 370.

³ *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1950, p. 437.

Marxist-Leninist leadership. He said: "We want to lead the people to overthrow the enemy, and so we must keep our ranks in good order, we must march in step, our troops must be picked troops and our weapons good weapons."¹ On what basis can it be said that our ranks are in good order and that we march in step? In the opinion of Mao Tse-tung, it is only through Marxist-Leninist unity. How can our troops become picked troops? How can our weapons become good ones? The answer is to raise the ideological level of Marxism-Leninism throughout the Party. Mao Tse-tung said:

But so long as we can grasp the science of Marxism-Leninism, have confidence in the masses, stand closely together with the masses and lead them forward, we shall be fully able to surmount any obstacle and overcome any difficulty. Our strength will be invincible.²

In order to build and consolidate our Party ideologically, Mao Tse-tung found it necessary to devote much time and effort to the fight against various erroneous ideological trends.

He has explicitly linked the attitude towards Marxism-Leninism with Party spirit and regards the two as identical. He stated:

... the absence of a scientific attitude, that is, the absence of the Marxist-Leninist approach of uniting theory and practice, means that Party spirit is either absent or deficient.³

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Rectify the Party's Style of Work*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1962, p. 1.

² Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Peking, Vol. IV, p. 173.

³ Mao Tse-tung, *Reform Our Study*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1962, p. 7.

Mao Tse-tung pointed out in a most concise manner the two subjectivist trends, *i.e.*, dogmatism and empiricism, which occurred in the Party and which the Party had to oppose with great vigour. He said: "Dogmatism and empiricism alike are subjectivism, each originating from an opposite pole."¹ Originating from two opposite extremes, both trends meet at the same fundamental point, that is, one-sidedness. "Each sees only a part and not the whole."² On the basis of this one-sidedness which they have in common, both trends, in face of certain practical problems at a given time, will link up with each other and arrive at a common view.

These two subjectivist trends constitute the ideological foundation of all those who committed mistakes of either Right or "Left" opportunism in the Party. They deviate completely from Marxism-Leninism in the theory of knowledge, and therefore are critical problems in the inner-Party struggle between correct and incorrect ideologies. For this reason Mao Tse-tung deemed it necessary to defeat opportunism on this essential ideological question in order to combat various forms of it effectively.

The petty bourgeoisie is the social basis of these two forms of subjectivism. These erroneous, reactionary trends were a serious problem with us because a large number of our Party members came from the petty bourgeoisie. As Mao Tse-tung has said:

China is a country with a very large petty bourgeoisie and our Party is surrounded by this enormous class;

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Rectify the Party's Style of Work*, Peking, p. 10.

² *Ibid.*, p. 11.

a great number of our Party members come from this class, and when they join the Party they inevitably drag in with them a petty-bourgeois tail, be it long or short.¹

Therefore, for a long time Mao Tse-tung never relaxed his fight against subjectivist trends. In 1929, he concretely pointed out that it was necessary to:

(1) Teach Party members to apply the Marxist-Leninist method in analysing a political situation and appraising class forces in place of subjective analysis and appraisal. (2) Direct the Party members' attention to social and economic investigations and studies, to determine thereby the tactics of struggle and the methods of work, and make comrades understand that without the investigation of actual conditions they will fall into the abyss of fantasy and adventurism.²

In 1937, generalizing his long experiences, Mao Tse-tung wrote his remarkable philosophical works, *On Practice* and *On Contradiction*, which were directed against these two kinds of subjectivism. It was on the basis of these views that he later initiated the rectification movement, a movement of great historic significance in the history of our Party.

One of the outstanding contributions made by Mao Tse-tung in relation to the question of the Party was his exposure of these two kinds of subjectivism — dogmatism and empiricism — which, stemming from two opposite poles, nevertheless could merge with one another, and his

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1962, p. 5.

² Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, London, Vol. I, p. 112.

pointing out of the correct way to overcome these two kinds of subjectivism. He said:

. . . to combat subjectivism we must enable people of each of these two types to develop in the direction in which they are deficient and to merge with the other. Those with book-learning must develop in the direction of practice; only so will they not rest content with books, only so will they not commit dogmatist errors. Those experienced in work must take up the study of theory and must read seriously; only then will they be able to systematize and synthesize their experience and raise it to the level of theory, only then will they not mistake their partial experience for universal truth and not commit empiricist errors.¹

If the way pointed out by Mao Tse-tung is followed, the unity of theory and practice will be achieved.

In the exposition of his views, Mao Tse-tung has made frequent use of the following well-known saying of Stalin:

. . . theory becomes purposeless if it is not connected with revolutionary practice, just as practice gropes in the dark if its path is not illumined by revolutionary theory.²

Dogmatist mistakes belong to the former category; empiricist mistakes belong to the latter. To correct these two kinds of mistakes means to achieve the unity of theory and practice.

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Rectify the Party's Style of Work*, Peking, p. 10.

² J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Moscow, Vol. VI, p. 92.

The combination of the study of the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin with continuous study of the experiences of the masses is peculiar to the leadership of Mao Tse-tung. This is also what he means by "the integration of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution".

Based on our Party's experience in its work of leadership, Mao Tse-tung has pointed out:

In all the practical work of our Party, all correct leadership is necessarily "from the masses and to the masses." This means: take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action, and test the correctness of these ideas in such action of the masses. Then once again concentrate ideas from the masses and once again go to the masses so that the ideas are persevered in and carried through. And so on, over and over again in an endless spiral, with the ideas becoming more correct, more vital and richer each time. Such is the Marxist theory of knowledge.¹

How can we continually concentrate the ideas and experiences of the masses and then go to the masses? The correct thing to do is to adhere to the general guiding principles of Marxism-Leninism. The empiricists, forsaking the general guiding principles of Marxism-Leninism, only linger in a condition of scattered and unsystematic

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1962, p. 4.

ideas. The dogmatists, forsaking the ideas and the new experiences of the masses, are unable to study and turn them into the concentrated and systematic ideas. Because of this the empiricists and the dogmatists are bound to give incorrect leadership and the work in their charge is doomed to failure.

The thirty years' history of our Party is the history of the struggle between correct Marxist-Leninist leadership and incorrect anti-Marxist-Leninist leadership. It is also the history of how Mao Tse-tung's correct leadership has defeated erroneous leadership, thereby overcoming the setbacks and difficulties encountered in the revolution, and making possible its final great victory.

The struggle carried out by this correct leadership to oppose subjectivism ideologically and to oppose opportunism politically was linked with the fight against sectarianism in organizational matters.

Petty-bourgeois narrow-mindedness takes the form of sectarianism in political life and in organization, in addition to one-sidedness in ideology. Subjectivism means ideological isolation from the masses both inside and outside the Party, while sectarianism means political and organizational isolation from the masses both inside and outside the Party. They are two sides of the same coin. Such sectarianism had disastrous consequences over a long period.

In 1929 Mao Tse-tung severely attacked cliquism, pointing out that it "has an exceedingly corrosive and centrifugal effect".¹ Here, cliquism means sectarianism. In 1942, he said:

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, London, Vol. I, p. 113.

Having been steeled for twenty years, our Party is no longer dominated by sectarianism. Remnants of sectarianism, however, are still found both in the Party's internal relations and in the Party's external relations. Sectarian tendencies in internal relations lead to exclusiveness towards comrades inside the Party and hinder inner-Party unity and solidarity, while sectarian tendencies in external relations lead to exclusiveness towards people outside the Party and hinder the Party in its task of uniting the whole people. Only by uprooting this evil in both its aspects can the Party advance unimpeded in its great task of achieving unity among all Party comrades and among all the people of our country.¹

Another outstanding contribution made by Mao Tse-tung in relation to the question of the Party was that by hoisting this banner against sectarianism he cemented the entire ranks of the Party and developed correct relations between the Party and the masses. Obviously, it is only when we are ideologically and politically correct and only when we are correct in inner-Party relations and in our relations with the masses that our victory will be assured.

How can we overcome subjectivism and sectarianism in our Party most effectively and in an extensive way? As already mentioned, owing to historical conditions, a large number of our Party members come from the petty bourgeoisie. If we want to correct their various mistakes and to consolidate the unity of the Party we must

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Rectify the Party's Style of Work*, Peking, 1962, p. 13.

adopt an attitude at once serious and prudent rather than liberal or rash.

The third outstanding contribution made by Mao Tse-tung in relation to the question of the Party was that he initiated a form of movement befitting our inner-Party struggle, that is, the rectification movement — the study movement. Under the unified leadership of the Party this movement organizes, among the Party cadres and the rank-and-file members, a thorough study and discussion of problems in our Party's history, errors within the Party, and relevant Marxist-Leninist literature and Party documents; then by means of criticism and self-criticism the cadres and rank-and-file members of the Party are enabled gradually to achieve ideological and political awareness and, with the help of the Party, voluntarily to "stick to truth and correct mistakes". The aim of the movement is described by Mao Tse-tung as follows:

. . . first, "take warning from past mistakes to avoid future ones," and second, "cure the sickness to save the patient." The mistakes of the past must be exposed without sparing anyone's sensibilities; it is necessary to analyse and criticize what was bad in the past with a scientific attitude so that work in the future will be done more carefully and done better. This is what is meant by "take warning from past mistakes to avoid future ones." But our aim in exposing errors and criticizing shortcomings, like that of a doctor curing a sickness, is solely to save the patient and not to doctor him to death. A person with appendicitis is saved when the surgeon removes his appendix. So long as a person who has made mistakes does not hide his sickness for fear of treatment or persist in his mis-

takes until he is beyond cure, so long as he honestly and sincerely wishes to be cured and to mend his ways, we should welcome him and cure his sickness so that he can become a good comrade.¹

In short, the aim of the rectification movement is, as Mao Tse-tung has stated repeatedly, to achieve "the twin objectives of clarifying our ideas and uniting our comrades".² In other words, in dealing with the incorrect ideas within the Party, we must be serious and oppose a liberal attitude; at the same time we must be prudent and oppose a harsh attitude. This way of dealing with incorrect ideas has greatly benefited our Party and has been very successful; this has been proved by the entire history of our Party since the first rectification movement was launched in 1942.

Everyone can see that the rectification movement has wrought very extensive and profound changes in our Party. First, through the movement the Marxist-Leninist ideological level of the whole Party has been greatly raised. Secondly, our Party membership has rallied with unprecedented unity around the Central Committee and Mao Tse-tung. These two achievements have ensured and are ensuring that the political line of Mao Tse-tung is carried through in every field, thus enabling us to defeat one enemy after another.

In April 1945, the Party held its Seventh National Congress. It unified the whole Party, summarized the achievements of the Party in carrying out Mao Tse-tung's correct policy during the War of Resistance Against Japan and prepared for the victory of the people throughout

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

² Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, London, Vol. IV, p. 158.

the country. In the political report delivered at the congress, Mao Tse-tung set forth the policy and programme for rallying the entire Party and people in the struggle for the nation-wide victory of the revolution. The march of events during the past six years has testified to the complete correctness of the political line decided upon at the congress, as is evidenced by the entire realization of the nation-wide victory of the great revolution. This congress was held on the basis of the Party-wide rectification movement, and the whole body of the Party cadres, having gone through this movement, were therefore able to carry out successfully the historic task assigned them by the congress.

The things that were lost in the rectification movement were subjectivism and sectarianism together with stereotyped Party writing,¹ an expression of the two. But what our Party gained from the movement was that it was ideologically prepared and able to give political leadership to, and won victory in, a great people's revolution against imperialism.

Under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, our Party has become a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary party capable of shouldering any historic task.

¹ Stereotyped writing, or the "eight-legged essay", a special form of essay prescribed by the system of imperial examinations under China's feudal dynasties from the 15th to the 19th centuries, was a juggling with words, utterly void of content and concerned only with form. Every paragraph was written to a rigid pattern and even the number of words was prescribed; the writer perfunctorily spun out the essay by ringing the changes on the words in the theme. The "stereotyped Party writing" refers to the articles written by some people in our revolutionary ranks, in which revolutionary phrases and terms, piled up helter-skelter, took the place of an analysis of reality. Like the "eight-legged essay", these articles were nothing but verbiage.

Led by Mao Tse-tung and following the example of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, our Party has become a Bolshevized revolutionary party.

Herein lies the chief reason why our continued advance and further success in our cause are assured.

IX. CONCLUSION

The victory of the Chinese people's revolution is the victory of Marxism-Leninism in a large country of nearly 500 million people. This is another great revolution following the Great October Socialist Revolution. It is another type of great revolution, which broke out in a country oppressed by imperialism after the October Socialist Revolution.

Mao Tse-tung's writings have brought into focus, both ideologically and theoretically, this type of revolution in China. They have given concentrated expression to the extremely dynamic power of Marxism-Leninism in this revolution.

Lenin once wrote:

We do not regard Marx's theory as something completed and inviolable; on the contrary, we are convinced that it has only laid the foundation stone of the science which socialists *must* develop in all directions if they wish to keep pace with life. We think that an *independent* elaboration of Marx's theory is especially essential for Russian socialists; for this theory provides only general *guiding* principles, which, *in particular*, are applied in England differently than in

France, in France differently than in Germany, and in Germany differently than in Russia.¹

In the conclusion of the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*, it is pointed out:

The power of the Marxist-Leninist theory lies in the fact that it enables the Party to find the right orientation in any situation, to understand the inner connection of current events, to foresee their course and to perceive not only how and in what direction they are developing in the present, but how and in what direction they are bound to develop in the future.²

It is also pointed out:

Mastering the Marxist-Leninist theory means being able to enrich this theory with the new experience of the revolutionary movement, with new propositions and conclusions, it means being able to *develop it and advance it* without hesitating to replace — in accordance with the substance of the theory — such of its propositions and conclusions as have become antiquated by new ones corresponding to the new historical situation.³

It is precisely in this spirit of Lenin and Stalin that Mao Tse-tung has applied Marxism.

Obviously, it required great theoretical courage and creativeness on Mao Tse-tung's part to apply the general

¹ V. I. Lenin, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, pp. 211-12.

² *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1950, p. 437.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 438.

guiding principles of Marxism-Leninism to an oriental country because conditions here were very different from those in European capitalist countries. For this reason he met with opposition; but for the same reason his thinking has triumphed.

The conclusion to wage a protracted revolutionary war in the villages, use them to encircle and then take the cities; the conclusion to establish and maintain revolutionary power in many small bases and gradually develop and expand these bases through prolonged struggles until seizing power throughout the country — these clear-cut conclusions were reached by Mao Tse-tung over twenty years ago by applying Marxism-Leninism in his study of the problems of the Chinese revolution. They are new, Marxist conclusions arrived at in a colonial and semi-colonial country. These new conclusions are correct because they have been verified by the Chinese revolution and because they are being verified by realities in the countries of Southeast Asia. This demonstrates the irresistible power of the theory of Marxism-Leninism, the irresistible power of dialectics.

In his inaugural speech at the Trade Unions Conference of Asian and Australasian Countries in 1949, Liu Shao-chi said:

The way taken by the Chinese people in defeating imperialism and its lackeys and in founding the People's Republic of China is the way that should be taken by the peoples of many colonial and semi-colonial countries in their fight for national independence and people's democracy.


This is the way of Mao Tse-tung.

The thinking of Mao Tse-tung is a development of Marxism-Leninism in the East. This summary of the experiences of the revolution in the East is of grave significance for Marxism-Leninism. For the struggles in the world as a whole, it is of universal significance.

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毛泽东論中国革命

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外文出版社出版(北京)
1953年4月第一版
1963年4月第二版(譯文修訂本)
編号: (英)3050—440
00061
3-E-90P



OTHER WORKS BY CHEN PO-TA
AVAILABLE IN ENGLISH

**NOTES ON MAO TSE-TUNG'S "REPORT OF AN INVESTIGATION
INTO THE PEASANT MOVEMENT IN HUNAN"**

The *Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan* is an important work written by Mao Tse-tung during China's First Revolutionary Civil War (1924-27). It deals with and summarizes the experiences and results achieved by the flourishing peasant revolutionary movement at that time, and elucidates the importance of this movement in the Chinese revolution. The detailed analysis of the *Report* given in this pamphlet by Chen Po-ta will help readers gain a deeper understanding of this work by Mao Tse-tung.

NOTES ON THE TEN-YEAR CIVIL WAR (1927-37)

This book analyses with abundant historical facts the political and economic conditions of Chinese society during the period of the Second Revolutionary Civil War (1927-37). With great lucidity it discusses the way Mao Tse-tung applied the Marxist-Leninist theory to the solution of certain basic questions of the Chinese revolution during that period, such as agrarian movement, armed struggle, the establishment of base areas, and the building of the Party. It provides useful reference material for the study of Mao Tse-tung's works of this period and the history of the Chinese revolution.

A STUDY OF LAND RENT IN PRE-LIBERATION CHINA

The author has made a deep study of authentic data dealing with land rent in pre-liberation China. He describes the forms of land rent, its development and characteristics, and the price of land, revealing the nature of the land rent system at that time. This pamphlet gives the reader a picture of the class relations and general economic conditions in old China's rural areas and provides useful background knowledge for the study of New China's agriculture and the peasant question.